Este trabajo explora las representaciones de las mujeres en una selección de manuales escolares empleados en las escuelas paraguayas durante el período 1989-2020, con el objetivo de analizar el papel histórico atribuido a las mujeres en los relatos escolares acerca de la Guerra de la Triple Alianza. Se sostiene que a pesar del proceso de revisión del currículo escolar y la política educativa iniciado con la transición democrática en 1989 persisten las representaciones hegemónicas de las mujeres ligadas al nacionalismo, afianzando (...) los roles tradicionales de género en el marco de una sociedad patriarcal. (shrink)

O presente estudo investigou as relações entre qualidade de vida e presença de sintomas depressivos e ansiosos em profissionais da saúde que estão atuando com pacientes infectados pela COVID-19, em um hospital da região metropolitana de Porto Alegre. Setenta e um participantes (84,5% mulheres), com média de idade de 30 anos (± 6,7), responderam ao questionário sociodemográfico, ao Inventário de Depressão deBeck II, ao Inventário de Ansiedade de Beck e à Escala de Qualidade de Vida “WHOQOL-bref”. Dos profissionais amostrados, (...) observou-se escores significativamente maiores de depressão (64,8%) do que ansiedade (50,7%). Identificou-se que quanto maiores os escores de ansiedade e de depressão, menores os escores de qualidade de vida. Diante dos resultados, observou-se associações significativas em relação aos sintomas depressivos, aos sintomas ansiosos e à qualidade de vida. Concluiu-se que é de grande relevância abordar essa temática, visto que o prejuízo à saúde mental desses profissionais deve ser considerado, principalmente em tempos de pandemia. (shrink)

We show a sentence and modal square of opposition and equivalence to be expanded into an hexagon according to oe suggestion from William of Sherwood. This expansión is permittedby two sentence and modal rules.The logical relations of the square allow us to formulate several theorems in order to show a glimpse of the Medieval Logic complexity.

Este artigo se propõe a analisar o primeiro estágio do desenvolvimento da área de pesquisa em filosofia da psicanálise no Brasil, apresentando e descrevendo os trabalhos fundadores de seus pioneiros, produzidos entre a segunda metade dos anos 1970 e o início dos anos 1990. A seguir, ele discute e procura elucidar a ideia de uma “epistemologia da psicanálise” que domina este período inicial, propondo um conjunto de quatro argumentos para proporcionar uma visão mais sistemática de suas principais teses, a saber, (...) os argumentos analítico, defensivo, conciliatório e indutor. Como conclusão, é apontada a pesquisa que ainda é necessária para se obter um panorama mais abrangente deste movimento da história intelectual brasileira. (shrink)

We propose a new interpretation of the equation E=mc² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...) the nature of mass. (shrink)

Domestic violence is endemic across Latin America. It is legitimated by patriarchal Christian theologies and widespread gender inequality. Drawing on the work of women theologians and activists working in Argentina, Uruguay and elsewhere, this article explores women's networks of resistance against violence. These include public and legal acknowledgement of domestic violence; the transmission of life-affirming values; pastoral support in the denouncement of violence; and the development of open and fluid household structures.

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza un conjunto de obras sobre ríos y represas que pertenece a la serie titulada Represa /Represión (2012-) de la artista colombiana Carolina Caycedo. La pregunta de la que se ocupa esta investigación es ¿cómo las estrategias estéticas de estas obras identifican los problemas socio-ecológicos generados por las represas y contribuyen a articular imaginarios políticos de sostenibilidad? El argumento principal es que las obras de Caycedo sobre el río Yuma o Magdalena contribuyen con la construcción (...) de una memoria histórica ambiental, a partir de saberes populares, campesinos y cosmovisiones indígenas. Con este fin, este texto caracteriza el problema de las represas a partir de los conceptos de ‘extractivismo’, de Macarena Gómez-Barris, y ‘desterritorialización’, de Rob Nixon, para luego realizar un recorrido por las obras de la artista, de cuyo análisis se va construyendo una caracterización de la memoria histórica ambiental de un segmento del río Yuma. El marco conceptual del trabajo incluye las nociones de ‘seres-tierra’, de Marisol de la Cadena y ‘territorio’, de Arturo Escobar, así como ‘memoria de los ríos’, de Kristina Lyons. La metodología se basa en el análisis conceptual y técnico de las piezas de Caycedo en el marco interdisciplinar de las humanidades ambientales. El análisis concluye que las obras de Caycedo generan espacios de memoria histórica ambiental desde perspectivas trasnacionales y, en estos espacios de encuentro que constituyen las obras, se relacionan y rearticulan los extremos de falsos antagonismos como naturaleza/cultura, humano/no humano y ciencia/arte. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Sobre que investigan los Maestrantes de nuestra Institución formadora de docentes, es el tema de este trabajo. Con un enfoque cualitativo, metodología de diseño emergente y con instrumentos como formulario Google, el análisis de los documentos de tesis de la generación 2020-2022, presentamos la respuesta a esta interrogante. Los Maestrantes enfrentaron la situación atípica de la pandemia y el confinamiento por covid-19 y realizaron sus tesis bajo la metodología de investigación-acción. Desarrollaron competencias del perfil de egreso de la Institución, al (...) generar conocimiento y mejorar la calidad de su enseñanza en beneficio de sus estudiantes. (shrink)

Rho proteins belong to the small GTPases superfamily. They function as molecular switches that, in response to diverse stimuli, control key signaling and structural aspects of the cell. Although early studies proposed a role for Rho GTPases in cellular transformation, this effect was underestimated due to the fact that no genetic mutations affecting Rho‐encoding genes were found in tumors. Recently, it has become evident that Rho GTPases participate in the carcinogenic process by either overexpression of some of the members of (...) the family with oncogenic activity, downmodulation of other members with suggested tumor suppressor activity, or by alteration of upstream modulators or downstream effectors. Thus, alteration of the levels of expression of different members of the family of Rho GTPases has been detected in many types of human tumors leading to a great interest in the cellular effects elicited by these oncoproteins. This essay reviews the current evidence of dysregulation of Rho signaling by overexpression in human tumors. BioEssays 27:602–613, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...) to perform. This essay argues, first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of action. It then goes on to develop a different compatibilist strategy, one according to which responsibility is grounded in difference making, but the type of difference making it is grounded in does not require access to alternative possibilities. Indeed, it is a form of difference making that is clearly compatible with determinism. (shrink)

Many Christian thinkers have embraced the notion “art for art’s sake.” Chesterton did not. To the contrary, he saw such an idea as deeply problematic for a Christian aesthetic. In the following article, I will explore some philosophical aspects of the “art for art’s sake” movement and then explain why Chesterton parted company with it.

Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on (...) structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende aportar información concisa y útil acerca de un género cinematográfico sumamente apreciado por la crítica: el cine no narrativo. Para ello, en una primera parte se resaltan los fundamentos teóricos, sobre todo antropológicos, que dan a las películas no narrativas su carácter central, tanto estructural como elocutivo, como reflejo de un arte que reproduce el origen de los mitos; en una segunda parte se ofrecen ejemplos concretos de su funcionamiento con base en esos fundamentos y se (...) infieren los modos en que esas películas son recibidas por la audiencia; finalmente, se concluye cuál ha sido la influencia e importancia de este tipo de cine a lo largo de la historia y se explora el posible futuro de este tipo de cine. El método empleado es inductivo y cualitativo, por lo que la interpretación personal tiene primacía en este trabajo. (shrink)

En este artículo se realiza una semblanza general del pensador colombiano Darío Botero Uribe, en especial, sobre sus ideas en torno al pensamiento latinoamericano. En este sentido, se aborda el problema de la particularidad y la universalidad del pensamiento, la crítica de la modernización y el colonialismo intelectual, el problema de la cultura y de su puesto en la filosofía latinoamericana y colombiana, a la vez que establece una relación con la problemática del mestizaje indoamericano.

La igualdad entre hombres y mujeres no será plena mientras que no transformemos el orden patriarcal que sigue sustentando una diferenciación jerárquica entre unos y otras. Ello pasa por revisar la masculinidad tradicional y la racionalidad construida a imagen y semejanza del varón. Un reto que supone a su vez transformar las relaciones entre lo público y lo privado, así como las bases del conocimiento y de una concepción de lo humano basada en los privilegios masculinos y en la negación (...) de la diversidad.Equality will not be full if we don’t transform the patriarchal order that continues to support a hierarchical differentiation between men and women. This calls for reviewing the traditional masculinity and the rationality constructed in the image and the likeness of the male. A challenge which in turn means to transform the relationship between public and private, and the basis of knowledge and a conception of humanity based on male privilege and the denial of diversity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the semantic relation between continental drift and plate tectonics. The numerous attempts to account for this case in either Kuhnian or Lakatosian terms have been convincingly dismissed by Rachel Laudan, who nevertheless acknowledged that there was not yet a plausible alternative to explain the so called “geological revolution”. Several decades later, the epistemological side of this revolution has received much attention, while the semantic relation between drift theory and plate tectonics has remained (...) mainly unexplored. In studying this case under a new light, the notion of embedding, as distinguished from other sorts of intertheoretical relations :11–27, 2011), will have a particular significance. After formally analyzing the relationship between continental drift and plate tectonics, it will become evident that the models of drift theory are part of the models of plate tectonics, thereby fulfilling the conditions for embedding. All theoretical concepts from drift theory are presupposed in some theoretical concepts from plate tectonics, and all empirical concepts of the former are shared by the latter. Furthermore, all the successful paradigmatic applications of continental drift are also successful applications of plate tectonics. As a consequence, under the label “geological revolution”, we actually find a salient historical case of cumulative progress across theory change. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

The variations in how subjects respond to positively or negatively framed descriptions of the same issue have received attention from social science research, where, nevertheless, a naïve understanding of speech interpretation has undermined the different explanations offered. The present paper explores the semantic-pragmatic side of framing effects and provides a unifying explanation of this phenomenon in terms of a combined effect of pragmatic presuppositions and default implicatures. The paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of representations and cognitive processes involved (...) in the framing bias by showing how well-entrenched linguistic practices associated to frame choice, and conducive to an implicit focus, result in default implicatures on the addressee’s side. (shrink)

I present some ideas from medieval thinkers concerning sentences which subject term has no reference and as kif those sentences can admit truth values. I present the ideas of William of Ockham, Jean Buridan and Albert of Saxony, from the nominalist side, and Vicente Ferrer exposing the moderate realism. Then we present two New Spain thinkers, Alonso de la Veracruz and Tomas de Mercado.

May I be permitted to chat a little, by way of recreation, at the end of a somewhat toilsome and perhaps fruitless adventure?”1 So begins the introduction to Robert Browning’s “transcription,” as he entitles it, of Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, in which the principles of literal translation are discussed and defended.2 As one who has recently been on the same adventure as Robert Browning, I wonder whether it is not salutary to review his arguments, for I have come to believe firmly that (...) the path he took was fruitless, or very nearly so. Yet of the many translators, stretching into the most recent times, who have provided us with literal renditions of ancient Greek texts, he at least offered an apology for it, and a better one, in my view, than any I have seen. I want to try, by reviewing Browning’s arguments, to shed some light on why his adventure of translation was barren, and in the process state some precautions for the translation of ancient Greek literature. I am not sure whether these precautions apply to the philosophy of translation in general, for the differences between two languages vary greatly with time and place; nevertheless, the review may be of some general help. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natural to interpret it as the claim that the only facts that (...) are relevant to an agent’s freedom are certain facts about actual causes. This would imply that any non-actual facts are simply irrelevant to the freedom of agents. This paper argues that this interpretation is mistaken, and proposes a better one. It also discusses the related but more general question of the type of project that we are invested in when giving a theory of freedom: Are we interested in the bottom-level grounding facts, or are we interested in some higher-level facts? (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)